On the sidelines of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Riyadh last month, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and ministers from six Arab countries met to discuss a vision for the “day after” the war in Gaza.
Listening to President Biden’s speech today commemorating the 80th anniversary of the D-Day landing in Normandy, the disconnect between the rhetoric and current US policy was clear.
Had Biden been President rather than FDR, our policy of “repelling aggression” and making countries safe from a repetition of the Nazi invasions of 1939-41 would have seen our troops stop at the Rhine. By then, we could have said that the Nazi war machine was sufficiently reduced and, since you can’t destroy an ideology, the only result of the deaths of more German civilian casualties would be to create more Nazis.
In the Middle East especially where the Arabs follow the “strong horse” principle in their honor-shame societies, Hamas, much like the Nazis, must either surrender unconditionally or be destroyed utterly. Their movement must be discredited in the eyes of their fellow Arabs before any successful “Day After” can have any hope for success.
The answer, I think, to our half-hearted position on Israel suggests the Administration’s continued support of Obama’s perverse policy of recasting the revolutionary regime of Iran as something it manifestly is not: a rational actor that would work to stabilize the region rather than try to control it.
In a rational world, the U.S. would have told Iran to be prepared to lose both Hamas and Hezbollah. We haven’t and Iran will increasingly become a problem for the West. Here’s an easy prediction: once Iran unveils ballistic missiles capable of reaching London, Paris and Berlin, watch for a major shift of those powers beyond what we see today.
As usual, the biggest arm chair organization, the WEF, organizes another theoretical bull session regarding another's issues, in this case, Israel. It amazes me that globalists so blatantly claim ownership of others: countries, indeed whole continents!
Reality has no place in their world and it often seems that thst is Israel's biggest offense, that it constantly deals in what is, not what someone else thinks ought to be. And reality such as exists in Gaza is unpalatable to these effetes. Netanyahu, truth teller, must therefore, go. The liars, however, as in Hamas, will remain.
In its way, Israel may be the most honest country on earth. Can't have it.
I'm pretty sure there's already a playbook for what to do when the genocide ends. It's called Nuremberg for the Israeli and American government, media, and military!
Destroy Hamas, number one goal! Secure the place, number two goal! Engage serious partners to create a strategy for long term peace and required supportive tactics. We already have a successful model with Germany and Japan, and so, USE IT!!
“If you don't know where you're going, any road will take you there." It is leaderships responsibility to have plans for various outcomes and to put plans in place to get to desired outcomes. Leaders also have a vision and build plans. Not doing that is an abdication of responsibility. Just because it’s hard doesn’t mean it’s not essential. Contrary to the authors post the allies did this from almost day 1. https://www.thoughtco.com/world-war-ii-the-postwar-world-2361462
Prior to victory, the WWII allies discussed their goals ("total victory" in Europe and "unconditional surrender" in Japan) just as Israel has articulated its goals (returning all hostages, and ending Hamas rule). The allies also discussed how to coordinate their fighting. However, truly detailed plans for building actual postwar societies came only later, beginning in earnest only at Potsdam (which was after VE Day). Thank you for sharing that article, which indeed confirms this aspect of history.
Thanks for the comment . The Atlantic Charter did indeed layout the future vision for the world as well as rules of engagement. The current vision of ending Hamas rule and retuning hostages are near term goals. They are not a vision of the future that can guide strategy and tactics .
Thanks for the engagement Mark and for noting those key historical points. I don’t know if you’ve read the Atlantic Charter, it has eight general aims, none of which delve into the specifics of nation building. Rather the eight aims are very general goals such as “disarmament” and “a world free of want and fear” etc. which are not so different from Israel’s very general aims for Gaza.
The actual specifics for rebuilding came only later, as outgrowths of Potsdam: such as the Marshall Plan in Europe and the three of phase rebuilding plan in Japan. An early attempt to create a specific rebuilding plan for Germany in 1944, called the Mogenthau Plan, ultimately failed because it was premature.
Thank you for the engagement as well. Yes I have read it . The point I’d really like to engage you in though is your core point that there should be no day after plan as there is too much uncertainty . The role of leaders during uncertain times is to chart a path for a future and then enlist other stakeholders to enable that plan - that may be allies, their own populations, their adversaries and others. Determining where you want to go is key to figuring out how to get there. For example if the future vision was a de- radicalized Palestine population you April’s start with planning for humanitarian aid from day 1 and not as a reaction to other events. If you realized you had time clocks from your allies and the pressure would come from a humanitarian position you might also have planned for that. And yet without a vision and then a strategy which includes identifying barriers you don’t get tactics that support that vision.
I agree with you that uncertainty should not stop one from planning. Indeed, uncertainty is the very reason why one makes plans at all. My point, however, is actually a different one.
In this case, the elements that are absolutely needed for a day after plan are missing, specifically: partnerships.
Therefore Israel has two options at this time: to build a day after plan without partnerships at all, or to make assumptions about what roles the theoretical partners will play, but without involvement or consent of the actual partners. Both options would be, in my opinion, a recipe for disaster, just like the Morgenthau plan of 1944.
The third option is to first build the safety that the presumptive partners need (by removing lHamas) and then to engage with the partners properly.
Reasonable minds might disagree as to which of the three paths is best, and I certainly have my own opinion on that, but there is not much room to disagree about what the available options are.
Well that depends on your objective. Let’s assume the high level objective is security. That can be achieved by israel continuing to have security control over the West Bank and Gaza. No partners needed though that has tremendous costs. It can also be achieved by recruiting partners to provide security. Those are two options that you describe. So if you can recruit them great , if not israel goes it alone. If on the other hand the outcome desired is peace not just a ceasefire that likely requires a Palestinian state and then partners are required though not absolutely necessary. To ensure partners you declare your intent for a state which frees up partners to say we want to participate . By starting with the desired outcome and working toward that as the objective you don’t have to have any particular strategic option predefined. But you do work the tactics towards that goal. Because you started with the lower level how vs the what you will miss both the preferred strategic option to achieve the goal and other possible options.
When Israel clearly states what they want the plan will come naturally.
Thank you for writing such a well reasoned and articulated thought piece on the day after situation.
Listening to President Biden’s speech today commemorating the 80th anniversary of the D-Day landing in Normandy, the disconnect between the rhetoric and current US policy was clear.
Had Biden been President rather than FDR, our policy of “repelling aggression” and making countries safe from a repetition of the Nazi invasions of 1939-41 would have seen our troops stop at the Rhine. By then, we could have said that the Nazi war machine was sufficiently reduced and, since you can’t destroy an ideology, the only result of the deaths of more German civilian casualties would be to create more Nazis.
In the Middle East especially where the Arabs follow the “strong horse” principle in their honor-shame societies, Hamas, much like the Nazis, must either surrender unconditionally or be destroyed utterly. Their movement must be discredited in the eyes of their fellow Arabs before any successful “Day After” can have any hope for success.
The answer, I think, to our half-hearted position on Israel suggests the Administration’s continued support of Obama’s perverse policy of recasting the revolutionary regime of Iran as something it manifestly is not: a rational actor that would work to stabilize the region rather than try to control it.
In a rational world, the U.S. would have told Iran to be prepared to lose both Hamas and Hezbollah. We haven’t and Iran will increasingly become a problem for the West. Here’s an easy prediction: once Iran unveils ballistic missiles capable of reaching London, Paris and Berlin, watch for a major shift of those powers beyond what we see today.
As usual, the biggest arm chair organization, the WEF, organizes another theoretical bull session regarding another's issues, in this case, Israel. It amazes me that globalists so blatantly claim ownership of others: countries, indeed whole continents!
Reality has no place in their world and it often seems that thst is Israel's biggest offense, that it constantly deals in what is, not what someone else thinks ought to be. And reality such as exists in Gaza is unpalatable to these effetes. Netanyahu, truth teller, must therefore, go. The liars, however, as in Hamas, will remain.
In its way, Israel may be the most honest country on earth. Can't have it.
It seems to me a plan for the day after Hamas ceases to exist -- and only then-- is a worthy goal.
You do your day after plan the day after the enemy has unconditionally surrendered!
I'm pretty sure there's already a playbook for what to do when the genocide ends. It's called Nuremberg for the Israeli and American government, media, and military!
There shouldn’t be a plan because Gaza shouldn’t t exist.
Israel's "day after plan" would only need two words. "NEVER AGAIN".
Any policy which allowed the possibility of another Oct 7th should be avoided.
Destroy Hamas, number one goal! Secure the place, number two goal! Engage serious partners to create a strategy for long term peace and required supportive tactics. We already have a successful model with Germany and Japan, and so, USE IT!!
That was a whole lot of Zionist garbage. I sure am glad that experiment is almost over.
“If you don't know where you're going, any road will take you there." It is leaderships responsibility to have plans for various outcomes and to put plans in place to get to desired outcomes. Leaders also have a vision and build plans. Not doing that is an abdication of responsibility. Just because it’s hard doesn’t mean it’s not essential. Contrary to the authors post the allies did this from almost day 1. https://www.thoughtco.com/world-war-ii-the-postwar-world-2361462
Prior to victory, the WWII allies discussed their goals ("total victory" in Europe and "unconditional surrender" in Japan) just as Israel has articulated its goals (returning all hostages, and ending Hamas rule). The allies also discussed how to coordinate their fighting. However, truly detailed plans for building actual postwar societies came only later, beginning in earnest only at Potsdam (which was after VE Day). Thank you for sharing that article, which indeed confirms this aspect of history.
Thanks for the comment . The Atlantic Charter did indeed layout the future vision for the world as well as rules of engagement. The current vision of ending Hamas rule and retuning hostages are near term goals. They are not a vision of the future that can guide strategy and tactics .
Thanks for the engagement Mark and for noting those key historical points. I don’t know if you’ve read the Atlantic Charter, it has eight general aims, none of which delve into the specifics of nation building. Rather the eight aims are very general goals such as “disarmament” and “a world free of want and fear” etc. which are not so different from Israel’s very general aims for Gaza.
The actual specifics for rebuilding came only later, as outgrowths of Potsdam: such as the Marshall Plan in Europe and the three of phase rebuilding plan in Japan. An early attempt to create a specific rebuilding plan for Germany in 1944, called the Mogenthau Plan, ultimately failed because it was premature.
Thank you for the engagement as well. Yes I have read it . The point I’d really like to engage you in though is your core point that there should be no day after plan as there is too much uncertainty . The role of leaders during uncertain times is to chart a path for a future and then enlist other stakeholders to enable that plan - that may be allies, their own populations, their adversaries and others. Determining where you want to go is key to figuring out how to get there. For example if the future vision was a de- radicalized Palestine population you April’s start with planning for humanitarian aid from day 1 and not as a reaction to other events. If you realized you had time clocks from your allies and the pressure would come from a humanitarian position you might also have planned for that. And yet without a vision and then a strategy which includes identifying barriers you don’t get tactics that support that vision.
I agree with you that uncertainty should not stop one from planning. Indeed, uncertainty is the very reason why one makes plans at all. My point, however, is actually a different one.
In this case, the elements that are absolutely needed for a day after plan are missing, specifically: partnerships.
Therefore Israel has two options at this time: to build a day after plan without partnerships at all, or to make assumptions about what roles the theoretical partners will play, but without involvement or consent of the actual partners. Both options would be, in my opinion, a recipe for disaster, just like the Morgenthau plan of 1944.
The third option is to first build the safety that the presumptive partners need (by removing lHamas) and then to engage with the partners properly.
Reasonable minds might disagree as to which of the three paths is best, and I certainly have my own opinion on that, but there is not much room to disagree about what the available options are.
Well that depends on your objective. Let’s assume the high level objective is security. That can be achieved by israel continuing to have security control over the West Bank and Gaza. No partners needed though that has tremendous costs. It can also be achieved by recruiting partners to provide security. Those are two options that you describe. So if you can recruit them great , if not israel goes it alone. If on the other hand the outcome desired is peace not just a ceasefire that likely requires a Palestinian state and then partners are required though not absolutely necessary. To ensure partners you declare your intent for a state which frees up partners to say we want to participate . By starting with the desired outcome and working toward that as the objective you don’t have to have any particular strategic option predefined. But you do work the tactics towards that goal. Because you started with the lower level how vs the what you will miss both the preferred strategic option to achieve the goal and other possible options.
When Israel clearly states what they want the plan will come naturally.
There’s a big difference between applying a sterile methodology to every situation, and seeing things as they are and doing what makes sense.